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OH CAPTIVE! MY CAPTIVE! NEW YORK’S QUI 
TAM PROVISION FOR TAX IS VALIDATED IN  
THE CAPTIVE INSURANCE CONTEXT 
Abstract: On August 30, 2018, in Anonymous v. Anonymous, the Appellate Divi-
sion of the New York Supreme Court, First Judicial Department held, for the first 
time, that a plaintiff-relator had sufficiently alleged that the defendants had vio-
lated the New York False Claims Act by using a captive insurance company for 
the sole purpose of evading taxes. The tax evasion scheme was brought to light 
by a former employee who utilized the New York False Claims Act’s qui tam 
provision. A qui tam provision allows a private citizen to stand in the shoes of the 
government when bringing an action. This Comment argues that Anonymous is 
an example of how beneficial a tax qui tam provision can be in uncovering com-
plex and clandestine tax avoidance schemes. 
INTRODUCTION 
Tax fraud is a problem that can deprive governments of hundreds of mil-
lions of dollars in much needed revenue.1 Accordingly, governments take a 
variety of steps to identify and prevent tax evasion.2 The New York False 
Claims Act (NYFCA) attaches liability to those who knowingly attempt to de-
fraud the State.3 The qui tam provision of the NYFCA largely mirrors the 
whistleblower provisions contained in the federal False Claims Act (FCA).4 In 
                                                                                                                           
 1 See Deddeh A. Jones, Much Ado About Qui Tam for State Taxes, TAX ANALYSTS (Apr. 3, 2014) 
http://www.taxhistory.org/www/features.nsf/Articles/4E0BBBC30A84AA2785257E1B004F094B
?OpenDocument [https://perma.cc/RGJ6-KH92] (noting that the difference in taxes owed and taxes 
actually paid by citizens amounts to millions of dollars in lost revenue for state governments). 
 2 See, e.g., N.Y. STATE FIN. LAW § 189 (McKinney 2019) (allowing tax fraud to be enforced by 
private citizens); N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF TAXATION & FINANCE, CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS AND PROS-
ECUTIONS OF TAX FRAUD CASES: GUIDELINES 1–2 (2013), https://www.tax.ny.gov/pdf/enforcement/
cid_guidelines.pdf [https://perma.cc/JVA8-NE45] (explaining criminal enforcement of tax fraud). 
 3 N.Y. STATE FIN. LAW § 189. The New York False Claims Act (NYFCA) does not define fraud, but 
rather attaches liability for knowingly submitting claims that are false or fraudulent. See id. § 188(2) 
(defining false claims). 
 4 See Peter L. Faber, New York State False Claims Act: Background, in 2018 N.Y.U. INST. ON ST. 
& LOC. TAX’N § 2.03 (2018) (explaining that the NYFCA is modeled after the federal False Claims 
Act (FCA), and that prior to the 2010 tax amendment to the NYFCA, the two were nearly identical). 
Compare N.Y. STATE FIN. LAW § 189(a)–(b) (attaching liability to those who knowingly present a 
false statement to the government, or knowingly create a false record used to make a false claim), with 
FCA, 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a), (b) (2018) (same). A qui tam provision allows a private citizen to bring 
suit in the place of the state. See N.Y. STATE FIN. LAW § 190(2) (allowing citizens to bring suit for 
violation of the NYFCA “on behalf of the . . . state of New York or local government”); Qui Tam 
Action, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). Qui tam plaintiffs are often referred to as relators 
or, colloquially, “whistleblowers” because they draw attention to the fraud. See, e.g., Michael T. Fa-
II.-194 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 61:E. Supp. 
2010, however, New York deviated from the FCA by including within the 
NYFCA’s scope statements made under state tax law.5 Before New York 
amended the NYFCA, Congress had explicitly rejected the inclusion of tax 
statements within the scope of the FCA, and no state had departed from the 
FCA model.6 Since amending the NYFCA, New York courts have heard many 
cases dealing with this provision.7 
In 2018, in Anonymous v. Anonymous, the Appellate Division of the N.Y. 
Supreme Court, First Judicial Department (Appellate Division) rendered a 
landmark decision regarding the NYFCA.8 It was the first time that the court 
ruled on a claim brought under the NYFCA relating to a defendant’s abuse of 
tax incentives tied to captive insurance companies.9 In Anonymous, the Appel-
late Division found that a plaintiff-relator sufficiently pleaded that a corpora-
tion knowingly submitted a false tax return by treating its captive insurance 
company as legitimate in order to reap substantial tax benefits.10 The decision 
                                                                                                                           
tale et al., False Claims Act Litigation, in 2016 N.Y.U. INST. ON ST. & LOC. TAX’N § 6.04 (2016) 
(referring to relators as whistleblowers). Qui tam provisions are also often described as a form of 
private enforcement because they place the enforcement of the law in the hands of private citizens 
rather than the government. See Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., Whistleblowers and Qui Tam for Tax, 61 TAX 
L. 357, 363 (2008) (referring to whistleblower provisions in the FCA as means of “private enforce-
ment”). 
 5 N.Y. STATE FIN. LAW § 189(4) This provision attaches liability to one who “knowingly makes, 
uses, or causes to be made or used, a false record or statement material to an obligation to pay or 
transmit money or property to the state or a local government.” Id. § 189(1)(g) This provision applies 
to “claims, records, or statements made under the tax law” so long as the defendant’s net income sur-
passes $1 million in a taxable year and the damages exceed $350,000. Id. § 189(4); see also Faber, 
supra note 4, § 2.03 (providing context about the legislative history of the NYFCA). 
 6 See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(d) (excluding statements made under federal tax law from the scope of the 
FCA). This exclusion has been explained as a recognition of the Internal Revenue Service’s (IRS) 
exclusive authority to enforce the Tax Code. United States ex rel. Lissack v. Sakura Glob. Capital 
Mkts., 377 F.3d 145, 152–53 (2d Cir. 2004). 
 7 See Fatale et al., supra note 4, § 6.04 (describing New York as having experienced a rash of 
FCA lawsuits dealing with state taxes); see, e.g., People v. Sprint Nextel Corp., 42 N.E.3d 655, 657 
(N.Y. 2015) (ruling on a NYFCA claim brought against Sprint for failing to charge taxes on certain 
types of calls). 
 8 See 83 N.Y.S.3d 472, 474 (App. Div. 2018). 
 9 See id. at 478–79 (evaluating the plaintiff-relator’s allegations regarding the defendant’s use of 
its captive insurance company to avoid paying taxes). A captive insurance company is defined by 
N.Y. Insurance Law to be a subsidiary that only insures risks for its parent company. N.Y. INS. LAW 
§ 7003(a)(1) (McKinney 2019). Ultimately, Anonymous explains New York’s decision to bring tax 
fraud within the scope of the NYFCA. See Jones, supra note 1 (describing the benefits of tax qui tam 
provisions as expanding enforcement capabilities and allowing more information to be discovered by 
insiders). 
 10 See Anonymous, 83 N.Y.S.3d at 474 (holding that plaintiff-relator sufficiently alleged that 
Moody’s treatment of Moody’s Assurance Company (MAC) was improper and that Moody’s know-
ingly took this position to avoid paying taxes). The tax benefits of captives are two-fold. See I.R.C. 
§ 162 (2018) (allowing a tax deduction or ordinary & necessary business expenses); N.Y. TAX LAW 
§ 1502-b(a) (McKinney 2019) (establishing a favorable tax rate for captive insurance companies). 
First, the parent company can deduct its premium payments as a trade or business expense for federal 
tax purposes. I.R.C. § 162. Second, the captive pays an extremely low tax rate on only its premium 
2020] New York’s Qui Tam Tax Provision and Captive Insurance II.-195 
highlights the policy advantages of enforcing certain types of tax fraud through 
private enforcement mechanisms.11 Specifically, the NYFCA allows govern-
ment agencies to pursue other enforcement actions, enables qui tam plaintiffs 
to plead claims more easily, and brings tax avoidance practices into the view of 
the general public.12 
Part I of this Comment gives an overview of the statutory framework es-
tablished by New York’s tax, insurance, and whistleblower laws.13 It then ex-
plains the facts at issue in Anonymous and the court’s decision.14 Part II of this 
Comment examines the law the Appellate Division relied on in reaching its 
decision.15 Part II also discusses other notable examples of cases brought under 
the NYFCA’s tax provision.16 Finally, Part III argues that the NYFCA’s pri-
vate enforcement mechanisms provide significant benefits to society because 
tax evasion through the means of captive insurance companies can be complex 
and involve layers of secrecy, which these mechanisms help to unravel.17 
I. NEW YORK’S STATUTORY FRAMEWORK AND FACTUAL  
BACKGROUND OF ANONYMOUS 
Anonymous derives its novelty in part from New York’s unique statutory 
scheme.18 Section A of this Part details the statutes that governed the Appellate 
Division’s analysis in Anonymous.19 Section B of this Part explains the facts of 
Anonymous and the Appellate Division’s ruling.20 
A. New York’s Captive Insurance Company Tax Framework  
and the New York False Claims Act 
Since the invention of captive insurance companies, businesses realized 
that they could be valuable risk management tools; however, states were 
                                                                                                                           
income. See infra note 25 and accompanying text (describing the progressive tax structure for captive 
insurance companies). Plaintiff alleges that these practices deprived New York of $120 million in tax 
revenue. State ex rel. Banerjee v. Moody’s Corp., No. 103997/2012, 2016 WL 7252487, at *4 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. Dec. 8, 2016). 
 11 See infra notes 134–153 and accompanying text (discussing the various policy benefits of tax 
qui tam provisions). 
 12 See infra notes 134–153 and accompanying text. 
 13 See infra notes 23–50 and accompanying text. 
 14 See infra notes 50–86 and accompanying text. 
 15 See infra notes 87–109 and accompanying text. 
 16 See infra notes 110–123 and accompanying text. 
 17 See infra notes 124–156 and accompanying text. 
 18 See N.Y. STATE FIN. LAW § 189(4)(a) (permitting the NYFCA to apply to tax statements). See 
generally Anonymous, 83 N.Y.S.3d 472 (dealing with an alleged false claim arising out of Moody’s tax 
treatment of a captive insurance company for the first time under the tax provision of the NYFCA). 
 19 See infra notes 21–50 and accompanying text. 
 20 See infra notes 51–86 and accompanying text. 
II.-196 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 61:E. Supp. 
somewhat delayed in realizing that they could share in the benefits as well.21 
Once states realized that attracting captives to the state could lead to revenue 
and job creation, they began passing legislation to that effect.22 In 1997, the 
N.Y. State Legislature enacted legislation authorizing entities conducting busi-
ness within the state to create captive insurance companies.23 A captive insur-
ance company is a subsidiary company that is created by a parent company 
solely for the purpose of providing insurance to the parent company.24 Under 
N.Y. insurance law, these captive insurance companies are given favorable tax 
treatment so long as they meet certain requirements.25 Since 2009, at least fifty 
percent of the captive’s revenue must consist of premiums from insurance ar-
rangements.26 If a captive’s premiums meet this threshold, the captive may file 
                                                                                                                           
 21 Joseph W. Tucciarone & Louis Biscotti, Captive Insurance Companies: A Common Sense 
Approach to Improved Risk Management, CPA J. (Dec. 2018), https://www.cpajournal.com/2018/12/
19/captive-insurance-companies/ [https://perma.cc/K4MH-6QAL]. 
 22 See id. Captive insurance companies can be valuable job creators through hiring and by creat-
ing a need for other businesses to service the captive industry. Id. They can also create revenue for 
state governments as their income is taxed. Id. 
 23 N.Y. INS. LAW §§ 7001(a), 7002(h) (McKinney 2019). 
 24 See id. § 7002(c), (h). Since the 1950s, major companies have utilized captive insurance com-
panies as risk management tools. Tucciarone & Biscotti, supra note 21. In 2019, the vast majority of 
Fortune 500 corporations had captive insurance companies. Id. Like all insurance companies, captives 
serve to transfer risk from the insured to the insurer. Id. In traditional insurance, the insured enters into 
a contract with the insurer and pays a premium to the insurer. Julia Kagan, Insurance, INVESTOPEDIA, 
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/i/insurance.asp [https://perma.cc/5JJ9-62SZ]. The insurer col-
lects premium payments from a pool of insureds who face similar risks, and in the event that one of 
the insureds makes a claim, the insurance company can pay the claim from the pool of premiums. Id. 
Where captive insurance differs is that the insured owns the insurance company, and therefore is the 
only entity that is paying premiums. Julia Kagan, Captive Insurance Company, INVESTOPEDIA, 
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/captive-insurance-company.asp [https://perma.cc/YLX6-QNRQ]. 
In this way, captives are a form of self-insurance because the insured is effectively setting money 
aside to offset the risk of future harm. Id. 
 25 N.Y. INS. LAW § 7003; N.Y. TAX LAW § 1502-b (McKinney 2019); Anonymous, 83 N.Y.S.3d 
at 475. Captives need to pay taxes only on their gross premium income, minus payments made on 
those premiums for risks in New York State. N.Y. TAX LAW § 1502-b; Anonymous, 83 N.Y.S.3d at 
475. Premiums include any payment for insurance coverage received by a captive. N.Y. TAX LAW 
§ 1502-b(c). Accordingly, premium income is the captive’s income derived from premium payments. 
See id. The tax rate on the captive’s premium income is small and decreases as the captive earns more 
premium income. Id. § 1502-b(a). For the first $20 million, the tax rate is 0.4%; for the second, the tax 
rate is 0.3%; for the third, the tax rate is 0.2%; and, for each dollar of premium income over $60 million, 
the captive pays 0.075%. Id. Captives must be licensed by the Department of Financial Services. N.Y. 
INS. LAW § 7003(c)(1). To be licensed, captives must submit a copy of their charters, bylaws, financial 
statements, plans of operations, and independent actuarial reports. Id. Additionally, captives are required 
to maintain a principal office and records in the State and to hold board meetings within the State. Id. 
§ 7003(b)(1). Further, captives are prohibited from providing certain types of insurance, such as workers’ 
compensation, employers’ liability, and motor vehicle liability insurance. Id. § 7003(a)(4)(A), (B). These 
exceptions aside, captives can provide any other type of insurance allowed under N.Y. law. See id. 
§§ 1113–1114 (listing the types of insurance authorized by the State of New York).  
 26 N.Y. TAX LAW § 2(11)(d) (McKinney 2019). In 2009, the N.Y. State Legislature was con-
cerned that captive insurance companies were causing the state to lose revenue by sheltering property 
unrelated to insurance policies from taxation. Anonymous, 83 N.Y.S.3d at 475. As a result, the legisla-
2020] New York’s Qui Tam Tax Provision and Captive Insurance II.-197 
a separate tax return and need only pay a special franchise tax rate on its pre-
mium income.27 If, however, the captive’s premium revenue does not reach the 
minimum threshold, it must file a combined tax return with the parent compa-
ny and pay a higher corporate income tax rate.28 
Through the NYFCA, the Legislature brought tax treatment of captive in-
surance companies—and tax avoidance more generally—within reach of both 
private lawsuits and enforcement actions by the N.Y. Attorney General.29 Like 
false claims laws in other states, the NYFCA closely mirrors the federal 
FCA.30 The NYFCA attaches liability to any person who knowingly submits a 
false record or statement to the state to avoid an obligation to pay the govern-
ment.31 The term “knowingly” encompasses actual knowledge, willful igno-
rance32, and reckless disregard33 of the veracity or inaccuracy of statements.34 
                                                                                                                           
ture amended Section 2(11) of the tax code to require that captive insurance companies earn at least 
half of their income from insurance premiums. Id. Any captive that derived more than half of its in-
come from sources other than insurance premiums were deemed overcapitalized insurance companies. 
Id. Section 2(11) was then updated again in 2014 to change the terminology from overcapitalized 
captive insurance company (OCCIC) to combinable captive insurance company (CCIC). N.Y. TAX 
LAW § 2(11)(d); Anonymous, 83 N.Y.S.3d at 475. An insurance arrangement is an insurance relation-
ship in which the risk falls on the insurer rather than on the insured. See Securitas Holdings, Inc. v. 
Comm’r, T.C. Memo 2014-225, at 18 (2014) (outlining the standard for what constitutes an insurance 
arrangement). 
 27 N.Y. TAX LAW § 1502-b(a)(2); Anonymous, 83 N.Y.S.3d at 475. If a captive’s premiums do 
not exceed the 50% threshold, the captive files a joint tax return with the parent company, hence the 
term “combinable captive insurance company.” See Anonymous, 83 N.Y.S.3d at 475. If the captive is 
able to file a separate tax return, it pays only a fraction of one percent in taxes on its premium income, 
depending on how much premium income the captive has in a given year. N.Y. TAX LAW § 1502-
b(a)(2); see supra note 25 and accompanying text (explaining the special franchise tax on captive 
insurance companies). 
 28 See Anonymous, 83 N.Y.S.3d at 475 (noting the consequences of being classified as an OCCIC, 
such as requiring the captive to file a combined tax return with the parent company and paying the 
corporate income tax rate). New York’s corporate tax rate for years before 2016 was seven and one-
tenth percent of the business income base. N.Y. TAX LAW § 210(1)(a) (McKinney 2019). A taxpay-
er’s business income base is the “portion of the taxpayer’s business income apportioned within the 
state” according to the rules set forth in Section 210 of the State tax law. Id. 
 29 See N.Y. STATE FIN. LAW §§ 189–190 (permitting false tax statements to be the subject of false 
claims act litigation from qui tam plaintiffs and the government). Although the government always 
had the ability to enforce tax fraud, the expansion of private enforcement to uncovering tax fraud 
makes it possible to uncover clandestine avoidance schemes. See infra notes 85–122 (noting the bene-
fits of qui tam enforcement, which include a greater ability to uncover tax fraud). Once fraudulent tax 
statements come to light, the government can then transform the private enforcement action into a 
public one by superseding the relator’s complaint. N.Y. STATE FIN. LAW § 190(5). 
 30 See Faber, supra note 4, § 2.03 (noting the similarities between the NYFCA and the FCA prior 
to the 2010 amendment). 
 31 N.Y. STATE FIN. LAW § 189. 
 32 Voluntary Ignorance, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 4 (“an unknowing or unaware 
state resulting from the neglect to take reasonable steps to acquire important knowledge”). 
 33 Disregard, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 4 (“conscious indifference to the conse-
quences of an act”). 
 34 N.Y. STATE FIN. LAW § 188(3). 
II.-198 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 61:E. Supp. 
The law applies both to the typical false claim and the reverse false claim.35 
Like the federal FCA, the NYFCA contains a qui tam provision.36 A qui tam 
provision allows private citizens, known as relators, to bring an action on be-
half of the government.37 Once a qui tam action is filed in New York, the state 
Attorney General then chooses whether to participate in the action.38 Such 
provisions incentivize whistleblowers to bring their concerns to the courts with 
a promise of fifteen to thirty percent of the damage award or settlement, de-
pending on whether the state or city deprived of revenue decides to intervene.39 
Qui tam provisions have several policy benefits.40 They expand the extent the 
government can pursue enforcement, thus alleviating the strain on agencies 
typically tasked with such enforcement.41 Further, qui tam actions often reveal 
details about defendants, in particular corporate defendants, that might be oth-
erwise difficult or impossible to uncover with a conventional agency investiga-
tion.42 Lastly, qui tam actions increase corporate accountability by removing 
                                                                                                                           
 35 See Anonymous, 83 N.Y.S.3d at 478 (noting the difference between the traditional false claim 
and the reverse false claim). The typical false claim involves making a false statement that causes the 
government to pay out money, whereas the reverse false claim occurs when a person or entity makes a 
false statement which deprives the government of money that it is owed. Id. 
 36 N.Y. STATE FIN. LAW § 190(2). 
 37 Qui Tam Action, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 4. Relators are often informally re-
ferred to as “whistleblowers” because they draw attention to fraud. See, e.g., Fatale et al., supra note 
4, § 6.04 (referring to relators as whistleblowers). 
 38 N.Y. STATE FIN. LAW § 190(5). Qui tam complaints must be served on the State. Id. § 190(2)(b). 
Upon notice of such complaints, the Attorney General may investigate the conduct alleged in the 
complaint. Id. After an investigation, the Attorney General must decide upon one of three possible 
courses of action: (1) to file a complaint against the defendant which will supersede the existing qui 
tam complaint; (2) intervene in the existing action and assist the plaintiff-relator; or, (3) decline to 
participate, allowing the plaintiff-relator to proceed alone. Id. § 190(c)–(f). 
 39 Id. § 190(6)(a)–(b). If the N.Y. Attorney General decides to initiate a proceeding, or the State 
or City elects to intervene, the plaintiff-relator is entitled to between 15–20% of the proceeds or set-
tlement of the action. Id. § 190(6)(a). If, however, the plaintiff-relator is left to pursue the claim alone, 
the plaintiff-relator is entitled to 25–30%. Id. § 190(6)(b). This structure, again, is similar to the FCA. 
31 U.S.C. § 3729; see Kathleen Clark & Nancy J. Moore, Financial Rewards for Whistleblowing 
Lawyers, 56 B.C. L. REV. 1697, 1704 (2015) (discussing the FCA and noting the government’s option 
to intervene). Under both the NYFCA and the FCA, the government chooses whether to intervene, 
and this may have a dramatic impact on the outcome. See Clark & Moore, supra, at 1704 (noting that 
the government chooses to intervene in less than one third of qui tam actions, but that in nearly all qui 
tam actions resulting in a reward, the government did choose to intervene). 
 40 See infra notes 41–43 and accompanying text (discussing that qui tam provisions can relieve 
strain on government agencies, provide more information, and increase corporate accountability). 
 41 Ventry, supra note 4, at 363. Revenue services suffer from a lack of resources that prevents 
them from pursuing many enforcement actions. Id. 
 42 See Press Release, N.Y. State Office of the Attorney Gen., A.G. Schneiderman Announces $40 
Million Settlement with Investment Management Company for Tax Abuses, Marking Largest Tax Whis-
tleblower Recovery in Office’s History (Apr. 18, 2017), https://ag.ny.gov/press-release/ag-schneiderman-
announces-40-million-settlement-investment-management-company-tax [https://perma.cc/6AX3-MBA5] 
[hereinafter A.G. Memo] (noting that without the whistleblower these issues would likely have re-
mained invisible). 
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the shroud of secrecy provided by agency investigations and allowing the pub-
lic to see how certain companies are manipulating the law for financial gain.43 
In 2010, New York expanded the NYFCA beyond the scope of the federal 
standard to include any submissions of tax returns made under the state tax law 
so long as the defendant meets the minimum income threshold, and the dam-
ages exceed the required amount.44 
Since 1986, Congress has explicitly refused to extend the FCA to income 
tax statements.45 This refusal is codified in § 3729(d) of the United States 
Code, which states that the FCA does not apply to false statements made under 
the Internal Revenue Code (Tax Code).46 Federal courts have interpreted this 
exclusion to be an official recognition of the Internal Revenue Service’s (IRS) 
exclusive jurisdiction over the enforcement of the Tax Code.47 The vast majori-
ty of states have followed the federal government’s lead.48 Indeed, when New 
York brought tax statements within the purview of the NYFCA, it became the 
first and only state with such a provision.49 Courts interpret Congress’s rejec-
tion of the approach eventually adopted by New York to reflect Congress’s 
belief in institutional competence.50 
                                                                                                                           
 43 See Ventry, supra note 4 (explaining that any privacy concerns must be balanced against the 
public benefit of exposing taxpayers who seek to cheat the tax system); see also Franziska Hertel, 
Note, Qui Tam for Tax?: Lessons from the States, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1897, 1919–21 (2013) (dis-
cussing how taxpayer privacy contributes to the smooth functioning of the U.S. tax system because it 
requires taxpayers to voluntarily surrender personal information, and if taxpayers believed that infor-
mation would not be kept private, they would be less willing to surrender it); Amy Hamilton, Qui Tam 
Troubles, Part IV: Does New York Have the Answer?, TAX ANALYSTS (July 7, 2014), http://www.tax
history.org/www/features.nsf/Articles/F44AA8EA9E28521585257D0F00702F25?OpenDocument 
[https://perma.cc/ET42-VBG2] (noting that qui tam provisions can encourage corporate responsibility 
and increase legal compliance by publicizing illegal behavior and martialing public opinion against 
those who commit fraud). 
 44 N.Y. STATE FIN. LAW § 189(4)(a)(i)–(ii). The NYFCA limits actions arising out of tax state-
ments to instances in which damages exceed $350,000 and defendants earn more than $1 million in 
annual net income. Id. 
 45 31 U.S.C. § 3729(d); see Lissack, 377 F.3d at 152–53 (noting that Congress added the provi-
sion excluding statements made under federal tax law, known as the “Tax Bar,” to the FCA in 1986). 
 46 31 U.S.C. § 3729(d). 
 47 See Lissack, 377 F.3d at 152–53. The court in Lissack concluded that the Tax Bar is a codifica-
tion of the existing common law, and the reservation of the IRS’s exclusive jurisdiction is derived 
from § 7401 of the Tax Code. Id. Section 7401 states that all civil actions brought for the collection of 
taxes are prohibited unless brought at the direction of the Secretary of the IRS or the Attorney General 
directs it. I.R.C. § 7401; Lissack, 377 F.3d at 152–53. 
 48 Akin Gump, LLP, New York False Claims Act, STATE FCA RESOURCE CTR. (Mar. 4, 2013), 
https://www.akingump.com/en/experience/practices/litigation/false-claims-act-qui-tam-defense/state-
fca-resource-center/new-york-false-claims-act.html [https://perma.cc/RCY8-6V9H]. 
 49 See Hertel, supra note 43, at 1915 (explaining that, as of 2013, New York was the only state 
explicitly to bring fraudulent tax statements within the reach of its false claims act). Some states, like 
Illinois, have implicitly allowed actions arising out of tax statements to be brought under the FCA, but 
do not have a statute that explicitly authorizes it. Id. 
 50 Lissack, 377 F.3d at 152–53; see also Hertel, supra note 43, at 1918–20 (explaining that the 
decision to grant the IRS the exclusive jurisdiction to enforce internal revenue code (Tax Code) re-
II.-200 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 61:E. Supp. 
B. Factual Setting of Anonymous v. Anonymous and the  
Appellate Division’s Decision 
In the realm of corporate tax evasion, captive insurance companies have 
become a well-known means for avoiding taxes.51 Though many captives pro-
vide legitimate insurance for their parent companies, some do not.52 In 2002, 
Moody’s Corporation (Moody’s), a financial service holding company, formed 
Moody’s Assurance Company (MAC) as a captive insurance company.53 MAC 
provides insurance coverage to Moody’s Investors Service, a credit agency 
subsidiary of Moody’s, for instances of terrorism, excess commercial liability 
coverage,54 and harm to reputation.55 From 2002 to 2009, MAC took ad-
vantage of the favorable tax structure provided by New York State by filing 
separate tax returns and paying the lower franchise tax rate on only its premi-
um income.56 Moody’s then deducted its premium payments to MAC from its 
taxable income.57 
                                                                                                                           
flects the belief that by virtue of its expertise, the IRS, partnered with the Department of Justice, is in 
the best position to determine when to bring enforcement proceedings). Another benefit of this ap-
proach is the privacy of the taxpayer. See Ventry, supra note 4 (explaining that the U.S. system of 
taxation depends on voluntary participation of taxpayers; therefore, taxpayers must believe that their 
information will be kept private because otherwise they would not willingly provide sensitive finan-
cial information). 
 51 See Tucciarone & Biscotti, supra note 21 (noting that captive insurance companies were placed 
on an IRS watch-list for tax evasion schemes). 
 52 Id. 
 53 Anonymous, 83 N.Y.S.3d at 475. Moody’s Corporation primarily issues credit ratings, performs 
market research and risk analysis, and provides analytics tools for businesses. About Moody’s, 
MOODY’S, https://about.moodys.io/about-us [https://perma.cc/GQ94-2LPU]. Its two largest subsidiar-
ies are Moody’s Investors Service and Moody’s Analytics. Id. In 2018, Moody’s reported over $4 
billion in total annual revenue. Id. 
 54 Excess liability insurance policies extend the coverage of an underlying insurance policy so 
that the policy will cover more expensive losses, which might otherwise exhaust the original policy. 
What Is Excess Liability Insurance?, COVERWALLET, https://www.coverwallet.com/general/excess-
liability-insurance [https://perma.cc/Z7WA-6BZ2]. 
 55 Anonymous, 83 N.Y.S.3d at 475. The N.Y. state legislature specifically contemplated the use of 
captive insurance companies by cities to provide coverage for the effects of the September 11, 2001, 
terrorist attacks. N.Y. INS. LAW § 7003(5). It is possible that Moody’s decision to insure against ter-
rorism flowed out of this same concern. See Background on: Terrorism Risk and Insurance, INS. IN-
FO. INST. (Dec. 16, 2019), https://www.iii.org/article/background-on-terrorism-risk-and-insurance 
[https://perma.cc/4HSK-C9WN] (explaining the impact that terrorism has had on the insurance indus-
try and insurance policies). There has also been some question about whether companies, especially 
financial services companies, should be able to self-insure against reputational damage. See Jay Adkin-
son, Whistleblower Yanks Back Rug to Expose Alleged Dirt of Moody’s Captive Insurance Company, 
FORBES (Sept. 5, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jayadkisson/2018/09/05/whistlerblower-yanks-
back-rug-to-expose-alleged-dirt-of-moodys-captive-insurance-company/#489483086cae [https://perma.
cc/KQ7G-FU3L] (explaining that the concern arises out of the company’s ability to trigger the policy 
with its own actions, thus creating a significant moral hazard). 
 56 Anonymous, 83 N.Y.S.3d at 475. 
 57 Id. Premium payments are payments made to MAC as consideration for insurance coverage. 
See N.Y. TAX LAW § 1502-b(c) (defining premiums). A New York corporation must pay an annual 
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This situation was forced to change when the New York legislature be-
came concerned that companies were using captives to shield income from 
taxation.58 In 2009, New York amended section 2 of its tax law to place more 
restrictions on the favorable tax treatments of captives.59 In response to the 
2009 amendment, Moody’s treated MAC as an overcapitalized captive insur-
ance company (OCCIC) because MAC’s insurance premiums did not make up 
the majority of MAC’s revenue.60 An OCCIC is any captive insurance compa-
ny that derives more than half of its revenue from bona fide insurance premi-
ums.61 As an OCCIC, MAC was required to file a combined tax return with 
Moody’s and was not subject to the low tax rate on its premium income, and 
instead had to pay a higher corporate tax rate on all taxable income.62 To avoid 
paying the higher corporate tax rate on MAC’s income in following years, 
Moody’s hired Marsh & McLennan Companies, Inc. (Marsh & McLennan), a 
professional services firm, to restructure MAC.63 This restructuring allowed 
Moody’s to return to treating MAC as a non-OCCIC and to continue taking 
advantage of the favorable tax rates.64 
Moody’s restructuring sparked concerns from within the company itself.65 
In 2012, an anonymous former Moody’s employee-turned-relator filed his first 
qui tam suit on behalf of New York State.66 On August 9, 2013, the plaintiff-
                                                                                                                           
franchise tax on its business income, which is the business’s net income minus any income deriving 
from investments and other exempted income, so long as the exempted incomes do not amount to 
more than net income. Id. § 208(8). 
 58 Anonymous, 83 N.Y.S.3d at 475. 
 59 Id. The amendment required captives to earn at least half of their income from insurance pre-
miums in order to qualify for favorable tax treatment. Id. 
 60 Id. 
 61 Id. The court explained that, to be bona fide premium income, the income must come from 
insurance arrangements that qualify as insurance for federal income tax purposes. Id. at 478–79. The 
court relied on Securitas Holdings, Inc. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 2014-225, to supply the multi 
factor test for when an arrangement qualifies as insurance for federal income tax purposes. Id.; see 
supra notes 91–92 (discussing the federal tax standard for an insurance arrangement).  62 See 
supra notes 25–23 and accompanying text (explaining how OCCIC classification impacts the tax 
treatment of a captive). 
 62 See supra notes 25–23 and accompanying text (explaining how OCCIC classification impacts 
the tax treatment of a captive). 
 63 Anonymous, 83 N.Y.S.3d at 475 (noting that Marsh & McLennan moved many of MAC’s prof-
itable intellectual property assets to a newly created subsidiary so that MAC’s premium income would 
constitute the majority of its revenue). As a professional services firm, Marsh & McLennan, through 
its many subsidiaries, provides risk management, insurance broking, and strategic consulting services. 
MARSH & MACLENNAN COS., AT A GLANCE, https://www.mmc.com/content/dam/mmc-web/Files/
MMC_AtAGlance_02022020_web.pdf [https://perma.cc/794M-TD2P]. 
 64 Anonymous, 83 N.Y.S.3d at 475. For the first $20 million of premium income, the tax rate for 
captives is 0.4%; for the second, the tax rate is 0.3%; for the third, the tax rate is 0.2%; and for each 
dollar of premium income over $60 million, the captive pays 0.075%. N.Y. INS. LAW § 1502-b(c). 
 65 Anonymous, 83 N.Y.S.3d at 476. 
 66 Id. Plaintiff-relator worked for Moody’s as a treasury manager in the company’s Treasury De-
partment. Banerjee, 2016 WL 7252487, at *4. He was instructed by supervisors to perform a cost-
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relator filed an amended complaint to include both the State and New York 
City.67 In his complaint, the plaintiff-relator alleged that MAC is a “sham” that 
Moody’s and co-defendant Marsh & McLennan created for the sole purpose of 
allowing Moody’s to avoid paying more than $120 million in corporate taxes 
to the State and the City.68 Both Moody’s and Marsh & McLennan moved to 
dismiss the plaintiff-relator’s claims on the basis that the plaintiff-relator failed 
to state a claim.69 Moody’s primarily asserted that its tax treatment of MAC 
was proper as a matter of law, while Marsh & McLennan argued that the plain-
tiff-relator had sued the incorrect corporate entity.70 
On November 30, 2016, the Supreme Court of New York, which is the 
state’s trial-level court, granted Marsh & McLennan’s motion to dismiss.71 The 
Supreme Court dismissed the plaintiff-relator’s complaint with prejudice and 
denied the plaintiff-relator’s request to amend the complaint to correct the 
name of the Marsh corporate entity.72 The plaintiff-relator appealed from this 
decision to the Appellate Division.73 
On appeal, the plaintiff-relator argued that the Supreme Court of New York 
abused its discretion by dismissing his complaint against Marsh & McLennan 
and by denying his request to amend it.74 Specifically, the plaintiff-relator argued 
that the Supreme Court of New York should have granted leave to amend be-
cause amendment would not be futile and would not unduly prejudice the de-
fendant.75 The Appellate Division agreed with the plaintiff-relator’s argument 
and held that the Supreme Court of New York had abused its discretion.76 
                                                                                                                           
benefit analysis of MAC in April 2011. Id. It was this project that caused the plaintiff-relator to be-
come concerned about the legality of MAC. Id. 
 67 Anonymous, 83 N.Y.S.3d at 476. New York City had the option to join the lawsuit as a plaintiff 
because Moody’s dealings also deprived the City of tax revenue. Banerjee, 2016 WL 7252487, at *4. 
 68 Banerjee, 2016 WL 7252487, at *2, *4 (alleging that MAC did not actually provide insurance 
for Moody’s, but rather, was simply a vehicle used to avoid paying taxes through a scheme of over-
valuing policies, circling back premium payments to Moody’s in the form of unsecured loans, and 
utilizing subsidiaries to shield income, thereby allowing MAC to qualify for the extremely low captive 
tax rates). 
 69 Anonymous, 83 N.Y.S.3d at 476, 480–81. Marsh & McLennan’s motion to dismiss hinged on 
the fact that the wrong corporate entity was named in the original complaint. Id at 31–32. 
 70 Id. at 476, 480–81. 
 71 Id. at 481. It appears that this dismissal was based on the fact that the plaintiff had named the 
wrong corporate entity as a defendant. Id.  
 72 Id. The court denied plaintiff-relator’s request to amend the complaint to include the proper 
corporate entity defendant because the plaintiff-relator failed to file a formal motion as the court had 
instructed. Id. 
 73 Id. at 474. Despite its name, the Supreme Court of New York is the trial-level court in the state. 
Structure of the Courts, NYCOURTS.GOV, https://www.nycourts.gov/courts/structure.shtml [https://
perma.cc/M7P6-L5QH]. The Appellate Division is the state’s intermediate appellate court, and the 
N.Y. Court of Appeals is the state’s highest court. Id. 
 74 Anonymous, 83 N.Y.S.3d at 481. 
 75 Id. A party’s leave to amend is subject to the discretion of the court, but may be denied if the 
amendment would be completely meritless or ineffective. 1 WEINSTEIN, KORN & MILLER CPLR 
2020] New York’s Qui Tam Tax Provision and Captive Insurance II.-203 
With respect to the allegations against Moody’s, on December 8, 2016, 
the Supreme Court of New York denied in part Moody’s motion to dismiss the 
complaint against it, but granted the motion with respect to tax year 2009.77 
The court ruled that the plaintiff-relator’s allegations sufficiently alleged that 
MAC should have been treated as an OCCIC.78 The court also determined that 
Moody’s knowingly submitted false claims by filing tax returns treating MAC 
as a legitimate captive.79 In reaching this decision, the court credited the plain-
tiff-relator’s allegations about MAC’s inability to pay claims.80 The court also 
noted that no claims had been made despite reputational harm that could have 
triggered coverage.81 Moody’s subsequently appealed this decision to the Ap-
pellate Division.82 
On appeal, Moody’s raised the same arguments that it raised in the Su-
preme Court of New York.83 Specifically, Moody’s argued that MAC’s licens-
ing and oversight by the Department of Financial Services indicated that 
Moody’s was complying with applicable regulations and that the plaintiff-
relator’s claims should be barred by past settlements with the State and the 
City.84 Moody’s also argued that the Supreme Court of New York should have 
relied on state law definitions of insurance, and therefore that it erred by ana-
                                                                                                                           
MANUAL § 19.14 (David L. Ferstendig ed., 3d ed. 2020). Similarly, leave to amend may be denied if 
the amendment would prejudice the party opposing the amendment. Prejudice must stem from the 
delay. Id. A common example of prejudice would be that the opposing party has no remedy because 
the statute of limitations has run. Id. 
 76 Anonymous, 83 N.Y.S.3d at 480–81. The Appellate Division spent no more than one paragraph 
addressing plaintiff-relator’s appeal of the Marsh & McLennan dismissal. See id. (lacking robust ex-
planation for the reversal of the Marsh & McLennan dismissal). 
 77 Banerjee, 2016 WL 7252487, at *1. In 2009, Moody’s treated MAC as an OCCIC, as it should 
have. Id. For this reason, the court granted Moody’s motion with respect to that year. Id. 
 78 Id. at *11. 
 79 See id. at *12 (explaining that plaintiff-relator met the pleading standards with allegations that 
sufficiently demonstrated that Moody’s had knowingly engaged in a scheme to avoid paying taxes). 
To state a claim under the NYFCA, a plaintiff-relator must show that “(1) defendants filed the tax 
records at issue, (2) that those records were actually false . . . , and (3) that defendants acted knowing-
ly in doing so.” Id. at 7. 
 80 Anonymous, 83 N.Y.S.3d at 478, 478 n.2. The court also noted the allegations that MAC did 
not pay claims, and that any claims that were paid were on smaller policies added later only to give 
the impression that MAC was legitimate. Id. 
 81 See Banerjee, 2016 WL 7252487, at *2 (noting that although Moody’s suffered considerable 
reputational damage during the 2008 financial crisis, Moody’s never made a claim under its reputa-
tional damage policy). 
 82 Anonymous, 83 N.Y.S.3d at 474, 476. 
 83 See id. at 479–80 (noting that Moody’s argued on appeal that the tax treatment of MAC was 
proper, the suit was barred by settlements with the State and the City, and MAC was a legitimate 
insurance company because it was licensed by the N.Y. Department of Financial Services). 
 84 Id. at 479. Despite Moody’s reliance on the settlements, the settlements were not signed by the 
N.Y. Attorney General, did not contain release language, and explicitly contained exceptions for fu-
ture actions arising out of fraud. Id. at 477, 480. 
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lyzing federal case law.85 The Appellate Division rejected each of these argu-
ments, ultimately affirming the decision of the Supreme Court of New York.86 
II. LEGAL CONTEXT OF ANONYMOUS 
The Appellate Division’s decision in Anonymous v. Anonymous is a mat-
ter of first impression because it is the first time that a parent company’s clas-
sification of its captive insurance company triggered an action under the 
NYFCA.87 This case, however, sits in the much larger and well-litigated con-
text of tax law, which provided the Appellate Division with familiar standards 
to decide that the plaintiff-relator sufficiently pleaded a cause of action under 
the NYFCA.88 
Section A of this Part discusses how the plaintiff’s inside knowledge of 
Moody’s actions and the existing authority on tax enforcement shaped the Su-
preme Court of New York’s decision.89 Section B of this Part then explains 
how Anonymous represents a narrow subset of tax enforcement under the ex-
pansive NYFCA.90 
A. The Anonymous Framework and the Role of a  
Relator’s Inside Knowledge 
The crux of the question for the Supreme Court of New York was whether 
Moody’s and MAC had reached an insurance arrangement under federal law.91 
The standard for what constitutes an insurance arrangement is a matter of 
common law.92 Ultimately, the standard focuses on whether the arrangement 
                                                                                                                           
 85 Id. at 478–79. (rejecting this argument entirely while noting that Moody’s did not suggest why 
the law was wrong, how state law definitions of insurance differed from the federal standard, or sug-
gest an alternative). 
 86 Id. at 481. 
 87 83 N.Y.S.3d 472, 474 (App. Div. 2018). 
 88 See State ex rel. Banerjee v. Moody’s Corp., No. 103997/2012, 2016 WL 7252487, at *8–10 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 8, 2016) (relying on federal tax enforcement cases); see also People v. Sprint 
Nextel Corp., 42 N.E.3d 655, 662 (N.Y. 2015) (interpreting the knowledge requirement and noting 
that it can be difficult to prove). Specifically, the issues in Anonymous depended on cases that deter-
mined what constitutes insurance under federal law and the general scienter element of the NYFCA. 
Banerjee, 2016 WL 7252487, at *8–10. 
 89 See infra notes 91–109 and accompanying text. 
 90 See infra notes 110–123 and accompanying text. 
 91 See Banerjee, 2016 WL 7252487, at *11–12 (analyzing whether the tax treatment of MAC was 
appropriate through the federal insurance arrangement framework). 
 92 See Securitas Holdings, Inc. v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2014-225, at 18 (2014) Although insur-
ance is not defined by statute, courts have established the standard for an arrangement to qualify as 
insurance for federal income tax purposes: (1) the arrangement needs to concern insurable risks; (2) 
risk must be shifted to the insurance provider; (3) risk must be distributed amongst policyholders; and 
(4) the relationship must satisfy commonly accepted notions of insurance. See Anonymous, 83 
N.Y.S.3d at 479 (citing In re In re Stewart’s Shops Corp., No. 825745, 2016 WL 1086062, at *24 
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shifts risk and fits in with the common understanding of insurance.93 To deter-
mine whether an insurance arrangement fits with the common understanding 
of insurance, courts consider several factors.94 First, whether the insurer is an 
organized insurance company.95 Second, whether the insurer could afford to 
cover claims.96 Third, whether the premiums paid were reasonable in relation 
to the market.97 Last, whether both premiums and claims were actually paid.98 
The Supreme Court of New York evaluated each of these factors and deter-
mined that the plaintiff-relator’s allegations did not meet the common under-
standing of insurance.99 
In so concluding, the Supreme Court of New York looked to the well-
pleaded allegations in the plaintiff-relator’s complaint.100 As a treasury manag-
er in Moody’s Treasury Department, the plaintiff-relator had an expansive 
amount of information at his disposal.101 Specifically, the circular nature of the 
payments to and from MAC evidenced that risk was not truly shifting from 
Moody’s to MAC.102 Further, the plaintiff-relator provided examples of specif-
ic premium payments made to MAC that far outpaced market rates.103 He also 
provided statements allegedly made by Moody’s executives to him that such 
high premiums would never be paid to third-party providers.104 The plaintiff-
                                                                                                                           
(N.Y. Div. Tax App. Mar. 10, 2016), aff’d 102 N.Y.S.3d 732 (App. Div. 2019)) (noting that courts 
have rejected the argument that the federal tax standard for insurance was inapplicable prior to 2014). 
 93 Anonymous, 83 N.Y.S.3d at 479 (describing risk-shifting as the essential element of insurance); 
Securitas, T.C. Memo. 2014-225, at 18–19 (recognizing the fundamental nature of risk-shifting within 
the insurance context and giving substantial weight to the common understanding element of the test). 
 94 Securitas, T.C. Memo 2014-225, at 18–19. 
 95 Id. at 18. Courts look to see whether the insurer is “organized, operated, and regulated as an 
insurance company.” Id. at 27. In doing so, the courts look to the corporate structure and management 
of the insurer, their financial records, and whether they were subject to the laws of the insurer’s state 
of incorporation. Id. 
 96 Id. 
 97 Id. 
 98 Id. 
 99 See Banerjee, 2016 WL 7252487, at *12 (holding that the allegations suggest that the arrange-
ment between Moody’s and MAC does not qualify as an insurance arrangement because the allega-
tions suggest that (1) claims were not made; (2) could not have been paid; and (3) the risk did not 
actually shift from the insured to the insurer). 
 100 Id. 
 101 See id. (describing the plaintiff-relator’s allegations, based on his knowledge of the inner-
workings of the Moody’s-MAC arrangement). 
 102 See id. at *10 (citing Stewart’s Shops Corp., 2016 WL 1086062, at *22) (noting that the pre-
mium payments made to MAC were circled back to Moody’s in the form of unsecured intercompany 
loans, and that because of this circular payment, the risk of loss never actually left the parent compa-
ny). A security interest is a “property interest created by agreement or operation of law to secure per-
formance of an obligation.” Security Interest, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 4. Accordingly, 
an unsecured loan is a loan where the lender does not take a security interest in any of the borrower’s 
assets. See id. 
 103 Banerjee, 2016 WL 7252487, at *10. 
 104 See id. at *10–11 (noting that plaintiff-relator alleged that the premiums were valued in an 
arbitrary manner above market rates). The N.Y. Supreme Court relied on Rent-A-Center v. Commis-
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relator’s in-depth knowledge of Moody’s conduct was similarly important in 
the court’s determination on the element of scienter.105 The knowledge re-
quirement of the NYFCA has been previously evaluated in tax avoidance cas-
es.106 Many of the plaintiff-relator’s claims stemmed from statements allegedly 
made by Moody’s executives.107 Beyond those statements, the plaintiff-relator 
alleged that because Moody’s had never made a claim under MAC’s policies 
and did not state MAC’s liabilities in investor reports,108 Moody’s did not treat 
MAC as a legitimate insurance provider.109 
B. Larger Context of Tax Enforcement Under the NYFCA 
The expansion of the NYFCA led to a significant increase in the number 
of private tax enforcement actions.110 These actions vary in detail, but settle-
ments and favorable decisions have substantially benefitted New York State by 
recapturing revenue.111 The 2015 decision in People v. Sprint Nextel Corp. is 
particularly influential.112 In that decision, the N.Y. Court of Appeals affirmed 
                                                                                                                           
sioner to show that premium rates should be independently determined. See id. (citing Rent-A-Center, 
142 T.C. 1, 27 (2014) (Buch, J., concurring). 
 105 See id. at *12. The Supreme Court discussed that the complaint contained several allegations 
that sufficiently showed knowledge and highlighted the plaintiff-relator’s allegation that a Moody’s 
executive stated that Moody’s did not want MAC to provide certain types of insurance because MAC 
would not have been able to pay out claims. See id.; Scienter, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 
4 (“A degree of knowledge that makes a person legally responsible for the consequences of his or her 
act or omission.”). 
 106 See, e.g., Sprint, 42 N.E.3d at 662 (explaining that the knowledge requirement is crucial be-
cause the NYFCA is not meant to apply to every case of unpaid taxes, but only those where the de-
fendant acted knowingly). 
 107 Banerjee, 2016 WL 7252487, at *12. The plaintiff-relator alleged that a Moody’s executive 
told him that Moody’s would never pay such high premiums to outside insurance providers. Id. The 
executive also allegedly said that MAC was undercapitalized and could not pay out claims. Id. 
 108 All publicly traded companies are required to publish financial reports that inform investors on 
the company’s performance and outlook. See Sham Gad, How to Efficiently Read an Annual Report, 
INVESTOPEDIA (Apr. 11, 2019), https://www.investopedia.com/articles/basics/10/efficiently-read-annual-
report.asp [https://perma.cc/M347-5YAZ]. 
 109 Banerjee, 2016 WL 7252487, at *12. 
 110 See Fatale et al., supra note 4, § 6.04 (noting that New York has experienced a surge of FCA 
lawsuits dealing with state taxes). 
 111 See, e.g., A.G. Memo, supra note 42 (noting that New York received $40 million in unpaid 
taxes). 
 112 See Fatale et al., supra note 4, § 6.04 (describing People v. Sprint Nextel Corp. as the most 
significant case in this fairly new field of law). In Sprint, Empire State Ventures, LLC (Empire) filed a 
qui tam complaint against Sprint Nextel Corporation (Sprint). 42 N.E.3d at 658–59. Empire alleged 
that Sprint knowingly failed to collect sales tax on a portion of its phone services by separating out, or 
“unbundling,” the percentage of the monthly charge that it attributed to interstate and international 
calls. Id. at 659. The N.Y. Attorney General filed a superseding complaint and converted the plain-
tiff’s action into a civil enforcement action. Id. at 658. In the Attorney General’s complaint, the gov-
ernment argued that the relevant tax law required collection on the full amount of fixed charges for 
voice services sold to New York customers, and that Sprint was aware of the interpretation and chose 
to pursue its “unbundling” scheme to lower prices and gain a competitive advantage in the market. Id. 
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the denial of the defendant’s motion to dismiss and determined that the N.Y. 
Attorney General had sufficiently pleaded a claim.113 The N.Y. Court of Ap-
peals relied on allegations that Sprint had initially complied with the tax law, 
but later deliberately chose not to comply despite warnings from the New York 
State Tax Department that the unbundling practice was illegal.114 In reaching 
this conclusion, the Court of Appeals noted the importance of allowing the At-
torney General to engage in further discovery to bolster the allegations.115 
The Attorney General of New York has also been successful in extracting 
large settlements from claims initially brought by whistleblowers under the 
NYFCA.116 In 2017, the Office of the Attorney General announced a record 
forty million dollar settlement with Harbert Management Corporation, an Ala-
bama-based investment management company.117 The settlement was heralded 
as a great victory by then-Attorney General Eric Schneiderman, who touted 
New York’s enforcement capabilities.118 Schneiderman also credited the anon-
ymous whistleblower for his contributions, a sentiment that was echoed by the 
relator’s lawyers who insisted that these types of cases would be unseen by 
regulators without the relator’s help.119 
Tax enforcement under the NYFCA has, however, not always resulted in 
a victory for plaintiffs and the state.120 In April 2018, the Supreme Court of 
New York granted a motion to dismiss for defendant Starbucks Corporation 
                                                                                                                           
at 659. Sprint moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that the government did not state a 
claim because, among other things, Sprint lacked the requisite knowledge and instead acted according 
to its own reasonable interpretation of the statute. Id. at 661. Sprint also argued that the Ex Post Facto 
Clause in Article 1, Section 10 of the U.S. Constitution, which operates to prevent states from passing 
laws that apply retroactively, prohibited such a retroactive application of the NYFCA. Id. at 662. The 
N.Y. Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of Sprint’s motion on all counts. Id. at 663. 
 113 Sprint, 42 N.E.3d at 657. The court affirmed the denial of the motion to dismiss because (1) 
the language of the relevant tax law was unambiguous and therefore not open to any alternate interpre-
tation; (2) federal law did not preempt the statute; (3) the application of the NYFCA was not barred by 
the Ex Post Facto Clause; and (4) the Attorney General sufficiently pleaded a cause of action under 
the NYFCA. Id. 
 114 Id. at 663. 
 115 Id. at 662. The court stated that, in light of the serious allegations and the factual disputes 
surrounding those allegations, the N.Y. Attorney General was entitled to further discovery to support 
the allegations in the complaint. 
 116 A.G. Memo, supra note 42. 
 117 Id. In bringing a case against Harbert Management Corporation, the State alleged that Har-
bert’s New York-based subsidiary and its executives knowingly took the fraudulent position that all of 
its income was from Alabama, the location of Harbert’s headquarters. Id. The case was originally 
brought by an anonymous relator who continued to provide information to the Attorney General’s 
office after the case was converted to a civil enforcement action. See id. (referring to the cooperation 
between private citizens and the government). 
 118 Id. Schneiderman, as a state senator, sponsored the bill to amend the NYFCA to bring state-
ments made under tax law within its scope. Id. 
 119 Id. 
 120 See, e.g., People ex rel. Hunter v. Starbucks Corp., 74 N.Y.S.3d 717, 728 (Sup. Ct. 2018) 
(dismissing a NYFCA claim brought against Starbucks). 
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(Starbucks).121 In that case, the plaintiff-relator created a survey of eighty Star-
bucks locations around the state and, based on the results of that survey, al-
leged that Starbucks had a practice of knowingly failing to charge sales tax for 
pastries that were either warmed by servers or prepared for on-premises con-
sumption.122 In evaluating the complaint, the Supreme Court of New York 
concluded that the survey was non-scientific and amounted to little more than 
anecdotal evidence.123 
III. CAPTIVE INSURANCE TREATMENT HIGHLIGHTS THE IMPORTANCE OF 
APPLYING THE NYFCA TO FRAUDULENT TAX STATEMENTS 
The Appellate Division reached the correct decision in Anonymous v. 
Anonymous by holding that the plaintiff-relator had sufficiently alleged that 
Moody’s tax treatment of MAC was unlawful.124 It properly used the settled 
federal law to determine that the Moody’s-MAC arrangement was not insur-
ance in the commonly accepted sense.125 The plaintiff-relator’s allegations 
demonstrated that MAC was not providing insurance coverage to Moody’s, but 
rather, MAC was a vehicle to conceal assets from corporate taxation.126 Fur-
ther, the Appellate Division properly determined that the plaintiff-relator’s 
complaint sufficiently alleged that Moody’s violations of the tax law were 
made knowingly.127 The Moody’s executives’ statements contained in the 
                                                                                                                           
 121 Id. 
 122 Id. at 719–721. Starbucks did not employ the relators in this case. Id. at 719. Rather, the rela-
tors were both attorneys and partners in a law firm, and they represented themselves. Id. They likely 
are not the type of relators that the New York legislature had in mind when crafting the NYFCA. See 
Timothy P. Noonan & William Cominsky, Calling All Tax Whistleblowers—New York Wants You!, 
59 ST. TAX NOTES 349, 350–51 (2011), https://www.hodgsonruss.com/media/publication/128_01_
2011%20Calling%20All%20Tax%20Whistleblowers.pdf [https://perma.cc/DFB2-PQN2] (opining 
that New York is looking for trustworthy whistleblowers with intimate knowledge and documentary 
evidence of a business’s fraudulent tax practices). 
 123 See Starbucks, 74 N.Y.S.3d at 728 (discounting the merits of the plaintiffs’ survey methods by 
comparing them to the accepted standards of scientific surveys, which require expert endorsement). 
The court also dismissed the complaint because the plaintiff-relators could not meet the $350,000 thresh-
old damages requirement of the NYFCA, presumably in part because the plaintiff-relators’ survey could 
not support the amount of damages they claimed. See id. at 728–29 (ruling that plaintiffs’ claims were 
unsupported by their survey and did not meet the statutory requirements). 
 124 See Anonymous v. Anonymous, 83 N.Y.S.3d 472, 478 (App. Div. 2018) (determining that the 
allegations in plaintiff-relator’s complaint tended to show that Moody’s treatment of MAC was un-
lawful). 
 125 See id. (applying the federal standard for insurance arrangements to Moody’s relationship with 
MAC). 
 126 See id. at 476–478 (outlining facts that showed MAC was used for the purpose of avoiding 
taxes). 
 127 See State ex rel. Banerjee v. Moody’s Corp., No. 103997/2012, 2016 WL 7252487, at *12, 
*24 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 8, 2016) (evaluating plaintiff-relator’s allegations of inculpatory statements 
made by Moody’s executives). Inculpatory means implying or imputing guilt. Inculpatory, MERRIAM-
WEBSTER DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2003). 
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plaintiff-relator’s complaint demonstrated that the executives knew that MAC 
was not providing insurance to Moody’s and implied that this structure was 
intentional.128 Moreover, the Appellate Division’s decision to allow this claim 
to proceed under the NYFCA fully effectuated the intent of the legislature.129 
The Appellate Division’s analysis was a straightforward application of the 
law.130 Yet, Anonymous is still significant because it provides an excellent rep-
resentation of the policy goals that underlie the NYFCA.131 
Tax qui tam provisions offer several benefits.132 Anonymous magnifies the 
importance of each of these benefits in the context of captive insurance com-
pany treatment.133 First, such provisions help alleviate the strain on agency 
resources by locating potential violators without using governmental funds.134 
Whereas enforcement agencies ordinarily must prioritize their collections, 
thereby allowing some violators to escape sanction, qui tam provisions allow 
whistleblowers to pursue enforcement in such cases.135 Relatedly, when com-
panies knowingly violate the New York tax code, the companies will seek to 
hide their evasion.136 This is especially true in the context of tax evasion 
through captive insurance companies, as exhibited by Moody’s conduct in 
Anonymous.137 Moody’s knowingly manipulated MAC’s structure to extract 
the greatest tax benefits and avoid detection.138 If not for the plaintiff-relator, 
this conduct likely would have been undetected by enforcement agencies.139 
                                                                                                                           
 128 See Banerjee, 2016 WL 7252487, at *12 (describing the allegations of Moody’s executives’ 
incriminating statements). 
 129 See Senate Bill S. S7169B, N.Y. ST. SENATE, https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/bills/2009/
s7169/amendment/b [https://perma.cc/U3RT-SRWG] (explaining that the amendments would enhance 
the ability to recover funds withheld from the government). 
 130 See Anonymous, 83 N.Y.S.3d at 478–79 (applying existing law to a new set of facts without 
modifying the standards). 
 131 See id. at 476 (discussing a complex system of tax evasion, using a third-party restructuring 
and circular payments that primarily relied on a whistleblower to uncover). 
 132 See infra notes 133–156 (noting several policy benefits of tax qui tam provisions). 
 133 See Anonymous, 83 N.Y.S.3d at 476–78 (describing a complex system designed to avoid taxes 
that was previously undisturbed by audits conducted by the State and New York City). 
 134 Hertel, supra note 43, at 1922–23 (explaining that tax whistleblower programs decrease in-
formation costs and expand the scope of enforcement beyond government enforcement agency limita-
tions). 
 135 Id. (noting that agencies prioritize certain enforcement actions at the expense of others). 
 136 See, e.g., Banerjee, 2016 WL 7252487, at *10–12 (noting that Moody’s enlisted Marsh & 
McLennan to restructure MAC to give the government the impression that MAC qualified for captive 
insurance tax treatment). The court also noted that Marsh & McLennan acknowledged that the MAC 
restructuring was very aggressive, and Moody’s executives made statements to the plaintiff-relator to 
discourage him from raising concerns over MAC’s treatment. Id. at 5; see also Hamilton, supra note 
43 (noting that complex tax evasion requires private citizens to assist in enforcement because compa-
nies seek to hide their behavior). 
 137 See Banerjee, 2016 WL 7252487, at *10–12 (detailing the complex scheme of restructuring to 
give the appearance that MAC was properly capitalized). 
 138 See Anonymous, 83 N.Y.S.3d at 478, 481 (noting that the allegations of knowledge were suffi-
cient to avoid summary judgment); Banerjee, 2016 WL 7252487, at *12 (same). The State and the 
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Second, claims brought under the NYFCA’s tax provision are very diffi-
cult for plaintiffs to prove because of the scienter requirement.140 This is illus-
trated by both the Harbert settlement announcement and the People ex rel. 
Hunter v. Starbucks Corp. dismissal.141 In the Harbert settlement announce-
ment, the Attorney General of New York and private attorneys recognized the 
necessity of public-private cooperation in bringing suspected NYFCA viola-
tions to light.142 Starbucks illustrates how much information qui tam plaintiffs 
need to survive a motion to dismiss.143 Anonymous demonstrates that, in the 
context of captive insurance companies, the case becomes only harder to 
make.144 Moody’s allegedly engaged in a complex scheme of circular pay-
ments, asset shifting, and arbitrary valuation of premiums.145 Unquestionably, 
the party in the best position to identify this information and understand the 
motivations of the actors involved is an insider, like the plaintiff-relator.146 The 
Supreme Court of New York appropriately credited this system by giving sig-
nificant weight to the statements allegedly made by Moody’s executives to the 
plaintiff-relator.147 Such statements were significant in surviving the defend-
                                                                                                                           
City had audited Moody’s actions, resulting in settlement agreements. Anonymous, 83 N.Y.S.3d at 
475, 479; Banerjee, 2016 WL 7252487, at *18. These agreements, however, did not note any fraud, 
otherwise they would not have contained the exception that allowed future actions to be brought 
against Moody’s for fraud. Anonymous, 83 N.Y.S.3d at 479. 
 139 Hamilton, supra note 43; see A.G. Memo, supra note 42 (noting that, generally, these issues 
would likely have remained invisible without the whistleblower). 
 140 See, e.g., People ex rel. Hunter v. Starbucks Corp., 74 N.Y.S.3d 717, 729 (Sup. Ct. 2018) 
(discounting a survey about failure to collect taxes on certain food items that examined eighty loca-
tions); A.G. Memo, supra note 42 (noting that whistleblowers often have information that is not un-
covered by the government). 
 141 See Starbucks, 74 N.Y.S.3d at 728–29 (holding that a self-conducted survey did not have 
enough scientific merit to support plaintiffs’ claims of tax avoidance); A.G. Memo, supra note 42 
(commenting that the plaintiff’s inside information was crucial in uncovering unlawful tax practices). 
 142 See A.G. Memo, supra note 42 (crediting the relator for shedding light on Harbert’s fraudulent 
reporting). 
 143 See Starbucks, 74 N.Y.S.3d at 728–29 (explaining how the survey that the plaintiffs put to-
gether was insufficient because it did not meet scientific standards for compiling surveys). 
 144 See Anonymous, 83 N.Y.S.3d at 476–77 (noting that Moody’s tax avoidance was multi-layered 
and involved unreasonable valuation of assets, circular payments, and illegitimate insurance policies); 
Banerjee, 2016 WL 7252487, at *10–12 (discussing the complexity of Moody’s actions). 
 145 Anonymous, 83 N.Y.S.3d at 476–77. 
 146 See Noonan & Cominsky, supra note 107, at 351 (contending that New York is looking for 
whistleblowers with intimate knowledge and documentary evidence of a business’s fraudulent tax 
practices); Hamilton, supra note 43 (noting that whistleblowers can help enforcement agencies elimi-
nate the complexity associated with tax avoidance schemes by providing inside information). 
 147 See Banerjee, 2016 WL 7252487, at *12 (describing the statements from Moody’s executives 
that implied knowledge of wrongdoing). In each step of the court’s analysis, the court considered the 
statements allegedly made by Moody’s executives first, before the allegations of any actions that 
might have given rise to similar inferences. See id. (reviewing inculpatory statements before wrongful 
conduct). 
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ant’s motion to dismiss.148 Notably, these statements contain the type of infor-
mation that an enforcement agency acting alone would be unlikely to obtain.149 
Lastly, the NYFCA exposes the public to the questionable tax practices of 
major corporations.150 This is a good thing.151 The benefit of this feature might 
not be so apparent in cases like People v. Sprint Nextel Corp., Starbucks, or the 
Harbert settlement announcement, where the evasion is simple and amounts to 
little more than filing a fraudulent tax return.152 To the general public, howev-
er, tax evasion through captive insurance companies is likely a fundamentally 
different type of issue.153 The sheer complexity of these schemes is what sepa-
rates them and raises the importance of public awareness.154 The multi-faceted 
schemes, like the one Moody’s was allegedly engaged, should raise the ire of 
the public and trigger a call for increased corporate responsibility.155 In this 
way, the NYFCA can encourage lawful behavior of corporations both directly 
and indirectly through its qui tam provision.156 
CONCLUSION 
In Anonymous v. Anonymous, the N.Y. Appellate Division, First Judicial 
Department, affirmed the denial of Moody’s motion to dismiss and reversed 
the granting of Marsh & McLennan’s motion to dismiss. In doing so, the court 
allowed a NYFCA claim alleging tax evasion through the use of a captive in-
surance company to proceed for the first time. The case stands as a major vic-
tory for New York’s unique qui tam provision for tax fraud because it high-
                                                                                                                           
 148 See id. (noting the alleged statements of the executives’ motivations before any actions that 
give rise to inferences of knowledge).  
 149 See Hamilton, supra note 43 (highlighting how complex tax evasion schemes are obscured 
from federal agencies and that insiders are extremely important in uncovering them). 
 150 See id. (noting that qui tam provisions can encourage lawful activity and hold corporations 
accountable). 
 151 See id. (noting that the publication of qui tam claims informs citizens and incentivizes corpo-
rations to abide by the law). 
 152 See Sprint, 42 N.E.3d at 658 (failing to collect sales tax on certain services); Starbucks, 74 
N.Y.S.3d at 721 (failing to collect sales tax on certain items); A.G. Memo, supra note 42 (reporting 
income from a different state); Hamilton, supra note 43 (“There is no real complexity, for example, 
when a retailer collects sales tax and pockets the money rather than passing it along to the govern-
ment.”). 
 153 See Hamilton, supra note 43. Some cases of tax evasion are simple and involve nothing more 
than withholding tax money from the government; however, others are more complex in that they 
involve layers of deception. Id. 
 154 See id. (noting that publicizing tax avoidance cases can encourage lawful behavior). 
 155 See Anonymous, 83 N.Y.S.3d at 476–77 (noting that Moody’s tax avoidance was multi-layered 
and involved unreasonable valuation of assets, circular payments, and illegitimate insurance policies); 
Hamilton, supra note 43. (highlighting the benefits of publicizing tax qui tam actions). 
 156 See N.Y. STATE FIN. LAW § 189(4)(a) (McKinney 2019) (setting forth the tax qui tam provi-
sion of the NYFCA); Hamilton, supra note 43 (explaining that qui tam enforcement increases lawful 
behavior by making an example out of bad actors). 
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lights the benefits of pursuing tax enforcement through such a provision. 
Anonymous, which dealt with tax avoidance through a captive insurance com-
pany, presented an opportunity to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of the 
NYFCA’s whistleblower provision. Specifically, these instances of fraud will 
likely go undetected by enforcement agencies acting alone. Further, private 
whistleblowers are privy to information that is often crucial to allowing these 
cases to survive a motion to dismiss. Finally, the whistleblower lawsuits shine 
a spotlight on the deceptive tax practices of corporations that might otherwise 
be kept secret, thus bringing to the public’s attention information that may 
prove useful in holding companies accountable. 
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